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Advances in computer processing and communications capabilities have 
contributed to the recent explosion of mesh network technologies. These technologies’ 
operational benefits are of particular interest for those operating in the littorals. The 
dynamic complexities of the littorals force tactical decision-makers to adapt to a 
constantly changing battlespace in a constrained temporal and spatial environment. 
Ongoing research into the integration of unmanned systems and sensors as mobile ad-hoc 
network (MANET) nodes highlights the significant potential to improve situational 
awareness and force efficiency in the littoral environment. However, difficulties 
associated with tactical network operations and management make the littorals 
particularly challenging. There remains a need for a unified approach to managing these 
networks in a coherent and effective manner. The complexity of the littorals emphasizes 
the inherent interconnectedness of MANET management and command and control (C2). 
As a result, new and innovative approaches to C2 are also required. This thesis explores 
the value of modern network management systems as they contribute to the richness of 
the human-network interface, as well as the integration of network management and 
maneuver at the tactical level. The result is a proposal for a novel framework for littoral 
MANET management and C2 as a corollary of cyber-physical maneuver. 
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Littoral waters will be the arena of modern fleet action. 
—W. P. Hughes (2000, p. 165) 
 
CAPT Wayne P. Hughes (USN, ret.) (2000) describes the littorals as a complex 
and dynamic operating domain characterized by dense commercial and maritime traffic, 
diverse terrain features, and a chaotic RF environment. Difficulties associated with 
tactical network operations and management make the littorals particularly challenging 
for naval forces. However, the performance characteristics of mesh networking 
technologies make them particularly well suited to address some of these shortfalls.1 The 
attributes of mesh networks—including the ability to dynamically self-organize, integrate 
with existing infrastructure, and provide reliable fault-tolerant connectivity across a 
highly scalable coverage area—make them an attractive solution for use in a multitude of 
applications (Misra, Misra, & Woungang, 2009). Haider and Shabbir (2014) assert that a 
mesh approach is “the right solution to enable highly mobile, highly reactive and quickly 
deployable maritime tactical networks” (p. 488).  
The U.S. Naval Surface Warfare community’s recent shift toward “distributed 
lethality” provides a prime example of the potential tactical advantages that maritime 
tactical mesh networks could provide, particularly in the littorals. Distributed Lethality 
(DL) is a maturing concept under development by the Distributed Lethality Task Force 
(DLTF). This concept is described by VADM Rowden, RADM Gumataotao, and RDML 
Fanta (2015) as “the condition gained by increasing the offensive power of individual 
components of the surface force.” Expanding the capacity of the surface fleet for 
executing offensive operations is the goal of DL (Solomon, 2015). DL widens the scope 
of naval Surface Action Groups (SAG) operations, introducing the concept of Adaptive 
Force Package (AFP) operations that integrate traditional and non-traditional platforms to 
provide “agile, tailorable combatant forces.” These evolving and adaptive force structures 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the use of the term “mesh network” in this thesis refers primarily to 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) as opposed to Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN); this multi-hop 
networking nuance is explicated in Chapter II.  
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seem to demand a robust mesh network to ensure effective command and control (C2) 
during sea control operations constrained or contested littoral environments.  
Current academic maritime mesh network research focuses primarily on 
commercial applications for archipelagic nations or countries with high-density maritime 
traffic. Research into the application of mesh technologies to military maritime tactical 
networks has received relatively minimal academic consideration; there is even less 
research concerning the management of these networks. Regardless, the Department of 
Defense is moving forward with the development, testing and evaluation of advanced 
multi-hop tactical networking systems. The integration of these systems into military 
operations will require novel approaches to C2. The new generation of network 
management systems (NMS) surpasses the quality of existing tools and enables network 
operators to function beyond contemporary network management paradigms.  
Distributed mesh network operations in the littorals require new and innovative 
approaches to command and control. Bordetsky and Netzer (2010) introduce the concept 
of adaptive management patterns as a function of mesh node positioning (mobility 
management) and application load control. Subsequently, Bordetsky, Benson and Hughes 
(2015) offer the concept of cyber-physical maneuver as the manifestation of adaptive 
management, as applied to littoral operations. New management tools can realize cyber-
physical maneuver by enabling network operators to influence the tactical placement of 
various platforms, thus allowing decision-makers to consider the location of physical 
assets and resource allocation as a function of mission requirements and application load.  
Increasing the richness of the human-network interface through the graphic 
display of network performance information is intended to help tactical-level decision 
makers process and adapt to changes in the battlespace more effectively. This requires a 
fundamental shift in how network management is operationalized. This thesis 
demonstrates that viewing a unified network management system as an integrated 
element of C2, as opposed to a support function, can ultimately aid the self-
synchronization of small-scale groups of heterogeneous assets operating in complex 
tactical environments. 
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A. LITTORAL OPERATIONS 
Ambiguity regarding the definition of the term “littoral” continues to spark debate 
across military and academic circles. Though the Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 
of this word is suitable for general use—“of, relating to, or situated or growing on or near 
a shore especially of the sea”—it is not always fully comprehended or clearly defined in 
its application (Vego, 2015). Joint Publication 1-02 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a) 
bifurcates the definition into two parts—“Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the 
shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore,” and “Landward: the area 
inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea” (p. 146). 
This explanation adds some clarity to the wordlist definition but lacks overall precision 
and fails to account for all pertinent geographical circumstances (Vego, 2015). Vego 
(2015) explains that the littorals “encompass areas bordering the waters of open 
peripheral seas, large archipelagoes, and enclosed and semienclosed seas” (p. 33). The 
addition of Vego’s geographic description provides perspective regarding the constituent 
areas of the littoral domain.  
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Littoral Operations Center (LOC) seeks to 
further the Navy’s ongoing efforts to expand its knowledge in this arena. The center’s 
mission is to conduct interdisciplinary research supporting U.S. Navy, allied and partner 
nation policy, strategy and technology development in support of littoral operations. The 
LOC (Naval Postgraduate School, n.d.) describes the littorals more broadly as the area 
where “hydrography, geography, commerce, fishing, mining, boundaries, maneuver and 
sustainment issues converge and complicate both the Offense and the Defense, to place 
exceptional demands on naval, aerial, and land forces that must operate, fight, and 
influence events there.” The convergence of these notions in the congested and contested 
coastal waters and their adjacent terrain illustrates the importance of continued study of 
this multi-faceted problem space. 
Difficulties faced in the littoral environment are especially evident across several 
hotbeds of tension, such as the Baltic and South China Seas, where the U.S. Navy and its 
allies face ever-growing challenges to power projection. Additionally, the increasing 
sophistication of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies and threat proliferation 
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continue to threaten the U.S Navy’s ability to operate freely in the maritime commons 
(Department of the Navy, 2015). Forces deployed in A2/AD environments face potential 
degradation of timely and relevant knowledge of the operating environment and disrupted 
or degraded C2 mechanisms. The inherent complexity of the littorals compounds the 
difficulties associated with operating in A2/AD environments, particularly when it is 
recognized that access denial will likely include cyber networks and the electromagnetic 
spectrum upon which operations so heavily depend. Bypassing littoral waters by 
projecting power ashore from a distance may work temporarily, however, operations will 
eventually require naval forces to operate in the littorals (Wade, 1996). In order to create 
and maintain sea control in this contested littoral environment, forces need to understand 
the battlespace and its impact on their ability to integrate forces and aggregate their 
collective effects.  
In “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (Department of the Navy, 
2015), Secretary Mabus outlines the concept of cross-domain synergy for the Joint Force 
to overcome the challenges posed by the A2/AD threat. The elements Secretary Mabus 
lists are particularly challenging in the littorals. However, mesh networks provide an 
opportunity to enhance joint force capabilities in this environment, especially considering 
these factors: 
• Battlespace awareness—networked assets can provide leadership with a 
more complete and timely understanding of the environment in which 
forces are operating.  
• Assured command and control—mesh networks provide self-forming, 
self-healing networks can provide flexible, robust, and resilient networks 
that will gracefully degrade in contested environments.  
• Cyberspace operations—network-centric capabilities embodied in mesh 
networks will enhance power projection capabilities for operations in 
cyberspace and their cyber-physical impacts. 
• Electromagnetic maneuver warfare—the hybrid nature of the network 
architectures discussed in this thesis support the future integration of 
alternative networking concepts such as those proposed in the Network 
Optional Warfare concept in development at NPS. Additionally, 
leveraging the heterogeneity of network assets through the development of 
EMCON and MILDEC tactics can enhance the impact of these networks.  
 5 
• Integrated fires—the ability to create temporary areas of battlespace 
control supported by the flexibility and scalability of mesh networks 
expands the Joint Force Commander’s kinetic and non-kinetic options in 
contested environments.  
While this list explicates the significance of mesh network concepts through a 
strategic/operational lens, this thesis focuses on their implementation and management at 
the tactical level.  
B. LITTORAL OPERATIONS SCENARIO 
The benefits of emerging MANET and Network Management technology can 
enhance force capabilities across the range of military operations; however, the 
CENETIX Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) and Maritime Interception 
Operations (MIO) experiments provide unique opportunities to explore the application of 
new network management systems. Chapter III discusses the details of these experiments. 
MIO is defined as “efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international 
waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods” 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a, p. 150). JP 1-02 delineates CWMD as “efforts against 
actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, 
use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, 
technologies, and means of delivery” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a, p. 53). Expanded 
Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO) are an extension of MIO that refers to the 
interception of vessels transporting terrorist-related materiel that pose an imminent threat 
and other related missions authorized by the President to prevent attacks against the 
United States (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). The scenario framework used for the 
experiment provides relevant context with which to analyze potential concepts of 
operations (CONOPS) and how these systems can influence tactical operations in the 
littorals. Consider the following scenario: 
Naval forces are tasked to conduct EMIO in support of ongoing CWMD 
operations in a contested littoral region. An AFP consisting of three Littoral Combat 
Ships (LCS) is operating in the area and has received intelligence that an unmarked small 
 6 
fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) recently embarked a container of shielded nuclear 
material and/or residue that was previously GPS-tagged by special operations forces in an 
earlier sensitive site exploitation (SSE) operation. The LCS Maritime Operations Center 
(MOC) receives information that this FIAC is operating in an area of dense maritime 
traffic near a busy commercial port. Equipped with modified-SUW mission packages, the 
LCS deploy several SeaFox USVs equipped with optical and standoff 
radiological/nuclear detection devices. Several BlackJack UAVs with optical sensors are 
also launched to conduct an area search for the vessel of interest (VOI). In addition to 
organic unmanned assets, several Mark VI patrol boats are under the tactical control of 
the AFP Commander and are equipped to conduct Visit, Board, Search and Seizure 
operations. All assets are equipped with MANET systems. Adversaries in the region are 
known to have shore-based mobile communications jamming capabilities.  
This vignette provides a contemporary and germane milieu for prospective 
missions and challenges faced by littoral forces. It is used as a framework to demonstrate 
the flexibility and resiliency MANETs can provide if C2 processes adapt to support them. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
U.S. littoral or blue-water forces do not yet have a standardized self-organizing, 
self-healing mobile ad-hoc network across the full spectrum of operations… but the 
building blocks are in place (K. Rothenhaus, personal communication, 15 January 2016). 
The purpose of this research is to explore solutions that can effectively leverage scalable 
and flexible communication infrastructures within the littoral operating environment to 
provide the tactical advantage. The primary question addressed in this research is the 
following:  
How can emerging network management tools support tactical-level mesh 
networks and influence C2 in littoral operations? 
Pursuing the answer to this question will address corollary objectives that include 
exploring the unique capabilities network operators need to support these operations and 
what opportunities non-traditional platforms can provide in littoral mesh-networked 
operations. 
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D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This research question explores mesh network operations to support new changes 
in C2, tactical maneuver, and the integration of dispersed naval forces operating in the 
littoral domain. It focuses on the application of network management software to the 
maneuver of ship nodes at the tactical level and investigates the potential and impact of 
these systems to provide network awareness to tactical-level decision makers.  
Discussion along the way inquires into network management capabilities required 
to monitor and manage dynamic mesh network performance in the littoral environment 
and looks to identify new networking roles for traditional and non-traditional platforms 
(e.g., using ships, such as LCS or off-shore basing platforms, and unmanned systems as 
foundational elements). This discussion examines the feasibility of integrating network 
management technologies into operations to strengthen littoral C4ISR capabilities and 
explores a littoral mesh network concept of operations for operating in conjunction with 
manned, unmanned and/or shore-based assets.  
This thesis does not address the operational or strategic level implications of mesh 
networks; rather it focuses on their tactical implementation in a littoral maritime 
environment. This work is done through experimental scenarios, not with fielded naval 
vessels, and does not address the technological deficiencies of currently fielded mesh 
networking technologies.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapters II provides literature review of supporting research and concepts 
relevant to research objectives. Chapter III outlines the research design and simulation 
modeling conducted to support littoral mesh networking concepts. Chapter IV is an 
overview of the experimentation results and description of potential use cases, as well as 
a discussion of NMS feasibility and constraints. Chapter V summarizes the overall 
conclusions reached and outlines future work.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The separation in traditional organizational structures between higher-level 
decision makers and lower-level elements controlling and monitoring decision 
implementation is a consequence of risk management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, 
in some cases, this separation may result in a functional disconnect between the 
operational decision maker and the network operator at the lowest tier; a decision maker 
may not even be aware of the physical network configuration supporting their operations. 
Likewise, a network operator may only be cognizant of the network for which they are 
responsible, yet unaware of factors that influence higher-level operational decisions. 
Changes in either domain are filtered within and through multiple organizational layers 
before adjustments are made. Effective network-enabled operations in the complex 
littorals require a minimization of that separation; a direct “connection” between decision 
makers and the physical network provided by network decision support tools is important 
for effective force deployment.  
A. NETWORK OPERATIONS CHALLENGES 
The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept proposes that the networking of 
assets to create a “well-informed but geographically dispersed force” will improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of military operations (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998, p. 8). 
Robust networks enhance information sharing and collaboration, creating shared 
situational awareness (SA) and self-synchronization (Alberts, 2002). By creating a 
network of reconnaissance, C2, and weapons systems; full spectrum dominance is 
achievable across the range of military operations (Koch & Golling, 2015). Cebrowski 
and Gartska (1998) also assert that the superiority provided by improved situational 
awareness of the environment, a better understanding of the operational situation, and the 
dramatic acceleration of decision-making cycles would allow the massing of effects from 
a lighter and leaner fighting force to disrupt the enemy’s C2 processes.  
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1. Organizational and Technological Impacts of Littoral Complexity 
Operations in the coastal and near-shore regions face considerably different 
conditions than those conducted in the open ocean. Complexity characterizes the physical 
characteristics of the littorals as well as the nature of the operations conducted there. One 
can define complexity as the interaction, interconnectivity and inter-relationship among 
elements of a system and between the system and its surroundings (Chan, 2001). Even in 
their most permissive state, operations in the littorals are constrained by interference 
factors from the surrounding environment. The land-sea interface that characterizes the 
littoral region brings with it the effects of diverse environmental conditions and dense 
commercial traffic. Figure 1 shows an example of shipping traffic concentrations in the 
littoral zone. It illustrates the conditions of physical clutter, which in turn create the 
preconditions for clutter in the cyber realm. Environmental conditions above and below 
the surface (e.g., sea state, fog, subsurface hazards and tidal patterns) present challenges 
for both offensive and defensive naval operations (Lindberg & Todd, 2001).  
Figure 1.  Shipping Traffic Density Map of the Aegean Sea 
 
Source: Aegean Sea marine traffic: Marine vessel traffic. (n.d.). Retrieved 
January 14, 2016, from http://www.marinevesseltraffic.com/2013/06/aegean-
sea-marine-traffic.html 
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Terrain is a major factor that differentiates blue water operations from those in the 
littorals. Topographical features such as cliffs, islands, vegetation, etc., not only impede 
on a maritime force’s ability to maneuver, but also their ability to manipulate and control 
the RF spectrum. Geography and meteorological/oceanographic conditions can attenuate 
signals or completely inhibit the ability of ships to communicate with each other. Figure 
2 illustrates the effect that terrain can have on maritime communications system 
propagation. These factors represent significant obstacles for communications networks, 
but at the same time offer additional opportunities for multi-hop relay networking. 
Figure 2.  Radio Coverage Analysis of Notional Communications System in 
Littoral Zone 
 
This radio coverage analysis shows signal-to-noise (SNR) levels as they interact with 
terrain features with red as the highest SNR and blue/violet as the regions with lowest 
SNR relative to the source. 
Proximity to shore presents another set of problems for forces operating in the 
littorals. While distances might be measured in thousands of miles in the open ocean, the 
littorals provide defenders the ability to rapidly deploy surface and subsurface assets from 
shorter distances (Vego, 2015). Off-shore islands, archipelagos and other features can be 
used to obfuscate enemy forces or allow them to intermingle with neutral maritime traffic 
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(Lindberg & Todd, 2001). Additionally, littoral forces find themselves deep within the 
effective range of modern coastal defense systems (Ya’ari, 2014). These could include 
defense batteries as well as short-range attack and reconnaissance aircraft, enemy UAVs, 
or other systems. Rear Admiral Ya’ari, Israel Navy, (2014) asserts that “the short 
distances within the littoral arena create acute problems of reduced reaction time and 
‘threat bearing’” (p. 82). Naval forces must adapt to these conditions to dominate 
opposing forces in the littoral environment.  
The complexity of operations is therefore influenced by enemy action (including 
those in the cyber realm), environmental interference, and the actions of the friendly 
force itself. From a C2 perspective, endogenous organizational complexity and the 
exogenous environment of operations should drive organizational and technological 
design; the complexity of force structure should match that which it faces. Bar-Yam’s 
(2003) Multiscale Complex Systems Analysis of Littoral Warfare concludes that warfare 
cannot be effectively performed in the highly complex littorals without first addressing 
organizational and technological deficiencies—primarily the need for “radically different 
coordination mechanisms in high complexity environments” (p. 23). This leads to the 
recognition that traditional organizational hierarchies are less effective when dealing with 
coordination across elements of an organization to execute tasks of high complexity. Van 
Creveld (1985) points out that systems will naturally become more complex to enable the 
transmission of information vertically, as well as laterally, between subordinate units. 
This adaptation subsequently changes the organizational structure of the force itself. Bar-
Yam (2003) offers the notion of “Form for Function,” pointing out that littoral warfare 
necessitates fine scale representation, e.g., small independently acting groups, flatter 




Figure 3.  Control Structure Examples of Varying Complexity 
 
Source: Bar-Yam, Y. (2003). Complexity of military conflict: Multiscale complex systems 
analysis of littoral warfare. Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ 
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.132.6248&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
The collaboration-enabled, self-organizing nature of small-unit groups at the 
tactical edge provides increased ability to sense, process and adapt to changes in the 
operating environment. In this case, complexity and adaptability complement each other. 
Adaptive systems are more likely to endure environmental disruptions and allow for 
smooth responses to changes in information conditions (Cares, 2005). However, 
reflecting this organizational adaptability in the technical networking methods used to 
connect them is critical.  
2. Impacts of Littoral Complexity on Decision-making Processes 
In addition to driving organizational and technological requirements, the complex 
context of the littorals unavoidably influences a decision maker’s perceptions, 
interpretations and actions within a decision space. Decisions in this domain must 
balance risk, uncertainty, and the additional constraints related to the presence of physical 
and cyber clutter unique to the littorals.  
In his landmark book, Command in War, Van Creveld (1985) proposes that one 
way a C2 structure can compensate for uncertainty in combat is by increasing the 
processing capacity of its decision-making cycles. The Lawson Command-Control Cycle 
describes C2 processes as they influence, or are influenced by, their surrounding 
environment (Sweeney, 2002). Hughes (2000) takes the Lawson cycle a step further to 
rectify what he refers to as a “flagrant deficiency [that] treated control as a one-sided 
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process” (p. 214). He addresses this by expanding Lawson’s cycle to illustrate the 
interaction between friendly and enemy C2 cycles across shared environment of clutter. 
Bordetsky, Benson and Hughes (2015) add that the opposing actions of anti-scouting, 
command and control counter-measures, and counterforce (countering the enemy’s 
ability to sense, decide and act) are critical, network-dependent processes. The 
networking of sensors, shooters and decision-makers in a shared information ecosystem 
allows forces to discover and disrupt enemy activities more quickly and efficiently. 
Figure 4 shows Hughes’ modified Lawson C2 cycle.  
Figure 4.  Hughes’ Modified Lawson Command-Control Cycle 
 
Source: Hughes, W. P. (2000). Fleet tactics and coastal combat (2nd ed.). Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Another popular decision framework is the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) 
loop, first introduced by John Boyd in 1987. Grant and Kooter (2005), discuss OODA 
and provide a comparison to other models in terms of C2 architectures. Boyd’s OODA 
loop is depicted in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  Boyd’s OODA Loop 
 
Source: Dettmer, H. W. (2011). Systems thinking and the cynefin framework—A strategic 
approach to managing complex systems. Port Angeles, WA: Goal Systems International.  
It is important for decision makers to be cognizant of the context within which 
they are operating—the causal relationships that exist between different types of systems 
inform the implementation of these decision-making processes. Snowden and Boone’s 
2007 Harvard Business Review article introduces the Cynefin sense-making framework 
that identifies five contexts in terms of the relationship between cause and effect: simple, 
complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder. The simple and complicated domains 
represent ordered systems in which there is a recognizable relationship between cause 
and effect, although it may not be readily apparent. Whereas, in the chaotic and complex 
domains, this relationship either does not exist or can only be perceived in retrospect. 
Disorder occurs “when it is unclear which of the other four contexts is predominant” 
(Snowden & Boone, n.d.). The boundaries between these areas represent transitions 
between decision domains; decision states move between these domains as the situation 
evolves. Snowden links the Cynefin framework to the OODA decision model by pointing 
out that “each domain needs its own variation of OODA” (Snowden, 2012). Figure 6 
illustrates the Cynefin framework and the decision models appropriate for each domain.  
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Figure 6.  The Cynefin Framework 
 
Source: Cognitive Edge. (n.d.). The cynefin framework [video]. Retrieved February 23, 
2016, from https://www.cognitive-edge.com 
Interacting elements at all levels of decision making with the littorals produce 
nonlinear, dynamic systems that shift decisions in the littorals from the ordered decision 
domain and into the complex domain. There are no right answers to decisions in the 
complex domain because of the unknowable relationship between cause and effect 
(Snowden & Boone, n.d.; Snowden, 2012). As a result, patterns in emergent order 
instruct new or unique approaches to problems—what Snowden (n.d.) refers to as 
“emergent practice.” Subsequently, the decision model offered by Snowden and Boone 
(n.d.) is probe-sense-respond.  
Traditionally, Boyd’s OODA loop is applied to situations in which it is assumed 
the tactical environment is stable enough to rapidly orient forces, decide, and act upon 
observable phenomena. An inference that might be drawn from the work of Snowden and 
Boone (n.d.) is that there are four decision domains only one of which, simple, and 
possibly a second, complicated, lend themselves to the traditional application of the 
OODA loop. What Lawson and Hughes are attempting to address is a reformulation of 
the command-control decision loop that is flexible enough to be effective in the other two 
decision domains, chaotic and complex. In littoral operations, interaction not only with 
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the environment but also with the adversary’s own decision cycle represents a significant 
tactical challenge that should be considered in the context of a complex decision domain. 
Commanders in the littorals must have the flexibility to face the challenges of the 
complex decision domain, while avoiding a decent into the inherently unpredictable 
domain of chaos or disorder. These decision makers can anticipate initial conditions, to 
some degree, based on a preconceived understanding of the mission, tacit knowledge 
gained from previous experiences, and initial or intended friendly force disposition. 
However, they cannot predict what impacts or influence the combination of 
environmental dynamics, enemy action and the movements of their own assets will have 
on their own C2 networks. Every mission or operation is different; therefore, decisions 
will require some novel combination of new or established techniques or tactics. The 
implementation of MANET in the littorals expands decision maker’s ability to observe 
patterns of response through networked nodes. MANET also provide multiple courses of 
action for adjusting network performance through topology manipulation; the existence 
of multiple options, or “competing hypotheses,” allows for “safe-to-fail” actions 
(Snowden, 2012). For example, a decision maker may have the ability to move several 
different nodes to bolster a mission-critical video feed and can observe the pattern of 
response to determine which action is successful. If observations indicate a different 
outcome than expected, he would have the flexibility to adjust and adapt to the situation. 
3. Human-Network Interface Considerations 
When considering the interface between a network operator and the network 
itself, it is important to understand how they interact. Modeling simplifies and 
decomposes complex systems through higher-level abstractions to allow a closer 
examination of the relationships, connections and influences that drive it. In many 
research fields, layered models are used to represent interrelationships between entities or 
theoretical strata within an entity. These are particularly useful when dealing with 
technology and the complexities of information flow at the human level. Military C2 is a 
fusion of both humans and information networks; understanding these models is the first 
step towards exploring the complex interface between the two. 
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The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 7-Layer model provides a reference 
framework for implementing communications protocols between nodes in a network. The 
International Standards Organization (ISO) provides a detailed description of this model 
in ISO/IEC 7498-1 (1996). This framework allows developers to have a common 
standard to guide the creation of more detailed interfaces. The layers in the OSI model 
represent seven related groups of functions, as depicted in Figure 7. While these 
functions are enabled by a multitude of applications, operating systems, technology and 
protocols; the 7-layer model allows the node interactions to be analyzed with a common 
frame of reference. Although this model illustrates the logical links between nodes at 
various levels, extant network connections only reside at the “physical” layer where bits 
are exchanged across transmission media.  
Figure 7.  OSI 7-Layer Communication Model 
 
Source: Comer, D. (2014). Computer networks and internets (6th ed.). Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
Bauer and Patrick (2004) assert that, despite the OSI model’s success, it remains 
incomplete because it does not take human interaction into account. They propose an 
extension to the 7-layer stack to include “display” (how the user interacts via hardware, 
software and interfaces), “human performance” (perception, cognition, etc., that capture 
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user information processing capabilities and limitations), and “human needs” (needs 
being addressed via technology use). While the Human-Computer Interface (HCI) model 
refers to these as Layers 8, 9 and 10, it should not be confused with the Layer 8 adaptive 
network management C2 function discussed by Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth.  
In order to understand how humans and information systems interact, it is 
necessary to explore how the models of these networked systems align to each other. 
Gateau (2007) accomplishes this by taking the combined HCI and OSI 10-layer stack 
(with minor modifications for clarity), and correlating each layer to the 3-layer 
Information Warfare model explicated by Alberts, Garstka, Hayes and Signori (2001). 
Alberts et al. (2001) categorize information effects on military operations into three 
domains—the physical, information, and cognitive domains. In this model, the physical 
domain represents the environments in which military forces operate and are connected 
by communications networks; data from the physical domain becomes contextualized, 
manipulated and shared in the Information domain. Human perception drives the creation 
of knowledge, understanding, and awareness, resulting in action through decision-making 
in the Cognitive domain. However, the granularity of this model does not adequately 
address the interfaces between each of these three domains (Gateau, 2007). The breadth 
of information domain remains relatively broad so it is appropriate to apportion it into 
addition layers by extracting technologies that are “rooted in the physical domain which 
process, store and manage data and information” (Gateau, 2007, p. 29) and decision 
support systems (DSS) and processes that shape information into something usable by 
humans and aid in its application. Shim et al. (2002) define DSS as “computer technology 
solutions that can be used to support complex decision making and problem solving” 
(p. 1). As a result, the Information Services Layer represents traffic flows and services as 
they pertain to data, information and explicit knowledge. It is also important to note the 
relationship between tasks and organizations in these models. Figure 8 illustrates that 
organizations are not just consumers of the information and decision support systems; 
they also interact with these systems through tasks and subtasks while concurrently 
controlling information flows and providing services within them (Gateau, 2007).  
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Figure 8.  Organization-Information-Technology Model 
 
Source: Gateau, J. (2007). Extending Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 
beyond network management: A MIB architecture for network-centric services. Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Gateau’s work focuses on an SNMP-based approach to enhance network centric 
services at the Technological, Information Services and Decision Support layers of the 
Organization-Information-Technology model. This thesis is therefore a logical extension 
of his work with specific implications in the Decision Support and Cognitive domains as 
they influence maneuver in the Physical domain. The remainder of this section provides a 
cursory overview of theories used to support the analysis provided in Chapter IV.  
a. Media Richness Theory 
In their paper titled “Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness 
and Structural Design,” Daft and Lengel (1986) lay the foundation for what is now called 
Media Richness Theory (MRT). They propose of information processing at the 
organizational level is the reduction of equivocality and uncertainty. These terms are 
defined in Table 1. MRT is most commonly associated with human-to-human 
communications (e.g., email, text messaging, video-teleconferencing, face-to-face 
interaction) because humans have the “capacity to cope and respond to ambiguity” (Daft 
& Lengel, 1986, p. 26). From a military perspective, the operational environment drives 
information processing requirements as well as levels of uncertainty and equivocality 
(Bergin, Hudgens, & Nissen, 2011). Dynamic and hostile operational environments force 
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organizations to gather more information to adapt to the complexity of the environment 
that it faces (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Table 1.   Equivocality versus Uncertainty 
Equivocality Uncertainty 
Ambiguity; the existence of multiple and 
conflicting interpretations of a situation 
The difference between the amount of 
information required to perform a task and 
the amount of information already 
possessed by an organization 
Adapted from Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. (1986). Organizational information requirements, media richness 
and structural design. Management Science, 32(5), 554–571. 
Daft and Lengel (1986), explain that media richness is the “ability of information 
to change understanding within a time interval. Communication transactions that can 
overcome different frames of reference or clarify ambiguous issues to change 
understanding in a timely manner are considered rich. Communications that require a 
long time to enable understanding or that cannot overcome different perspectives are 
lower in richness” (p. 560). We can consider this communication as exchange of 
information between a network management system and an operator or as information 
transactions in a higher-level social network; these are important considerations for 
decision makers processing and interpreting the tactical environment and analyzing 
information pertaining to the disposition and activities of their adversaries. 
This is especially relevant for network operators in the littoral environment. 
Reducing uncertainty for dynamic littoral operations requires the collection and 
processing of information in a more time and space constrained operating area that would 
be experienced in blue water operations. In the littorals, sensors and nodes can provide 
adequate (sometimes overwhelming) amounts of information, but the effectiveness and 
utility of the increased information flows is limited by the decision maker’s ability to 
cognitively process it in a timely manner. Additionally, elements of littoral complexity 
can amplify or obfuscate causes of network performance fluctuations that may be more 
readily discovered and addressed in other networks. DSS can reduce equivocality by 
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exposing causes of network instabilities or failure, node misconfigurations, faults and 
other issues to help network operators interpret and respond more quickly. 
b. Cyber-Physical Systems 
As sensors and systems continue to integrate into military C2 processes, as well as 
into civilian life through the “Internet of Things,” cyber-physical systems will play an 
ever-increasing role in how information is interpreted and acted upon. Cyber-physical 
systems embody the integration of computational and physical capabilities that enable 
interaction with the physical world across cyber space (Baheti & Gill, 2011). The 
interactive contrivance between the cyber realm, including embedded systems and 
networks, and the physical world is a crucial area for innovation (Chun et al., 2010). Of 
particular importance is the extension of cyber-physical systems to include human 
interaction. The concept of cyber-physical-social systems (CPSS) is discussed by Liu, 
Yang, Wen and Zhang (2011) as a framework for self-synchronization in C2 systems that 
represents the convergence of cyberspace and organizational, cognitive and physical 
networks. This framework includes the human as a role player in CPSS, coupling humans 
and physical systems in the decision-making process rather than leaving the human 
“outside the system boundaries,” as is the case with typical cyber-physical system 
implementation (Liu et al., 2011, p. 92). The integration and management of manned and 
unmanned platforms will require a paradigm shift in how a force’s actions affect, and are 
impacted by, the dynamic nature of physical and cyber clutter within the battlespace. 
c. Human-Systems Integration 
Human-Systems Integration (HSI) represents a system-level approach to enabling 
synergistic interaction between the human and the system to improve task effectiveness 
as a function of system and human performance. The central notion of HSI is that the 
human element is a key consideration in all phases of a system’s life cycle. Dolgov and 
Hottman (2012) characterize the human element as the “perceptual abilities, cognitive 
capacity, situational awareness, and the ability to perform under stress or in high 
cognitive-demand situations contribute to the effectiveness of the human–machine 
system” (p. 173). The HSI approach is a topic of much discussion in the realm of 
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unmanned systems development. The application of HSI is this area primarily focuses on 
analyzing how humans interact with unmanned systems to increase the operational 
effectiveness of the system and operator acting as a team. Dolgov and Hottman (2012) 
add that “displays, controls and the overall human-machine interface design are the 
component of HSI that compliments the user” (p. 174). Developers can gain insights on 
how to design systems that will better serve the end user and increase the efficiency of 
their interactions by focusing on satisfying user’s ergonomic needs, information flows 
and processing capabilities in situations of high stress or other cognition-affecting 
scenarios.  
4. Unmanned Platform Integration 
The ongoing development of new, highly capable unmanned platforms for air, 
surface, subsurface and land operations is dramatically changing how military operations 
are conducted. Advances in processing capabilities and computing power are bringing 
increased autonomy to the rapidly growing unmanned systems arena. However, the 
integration of these platforms in maritime operations still faces unresolved questions. 
Unmanned systems can fill lingering operational capability gaps; reducing threat 
exposure faced by manned platforms in hostile environments. In many cases, they are 
“the preferred alternatives especially for missions that are characterized as dull, dirty, or 
dangerous” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013, p. 20). The Unmanned Systems 
Integrated Roadmap (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) outlines the DOD’s 25-year 
vision for the technical development and integration of unmanned aerial, land and 
maritime systems. While this document does take a network-centric approach, it 
primarily discusses the future roles of unmanned vehicles as satellite communications 
gateways/relays but essentially ignores their integration into a network as MANET nodes. 
The potential benefits of unmanned aerial vehicles functioning as 
communications relays are relatively well researched. Rothal, Davis and Marlatt (2015) 
provide a sampling of NPS unmanned systems-related theses, reports and papers, 35 of 
which discuss their use as relays in different environments. Everly and Limmer (2014) 
provide a multi-objective cost-effectiveness analysis of 15 aerial platforms and nine 
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communications payloads. Quincy et al. (2010) discuss a novel command and control 
architecture for UAV relays in an high-value unit (HVU) defense role.  
There is, however, significantly less research regarding the implications of their 
participation as active nodes in a dynamic MANET architecture from a network 
operations perspective. Richard (2009) applies self-tuning adaptive control algorithms to 
optimize UAV position to support communications links between multiple ground 
antennae. Richard’s approach uses physical layer network performance as guidance input 
for UAVs and provides a basic example of how cyber-physical maneuver can realize 
enhancements in a tactical MANET with UAVs. The current deployment construct for 
unmanned assets like the MQ-4C Triton and MQ-9 Reaper limit their usefulness in 
dynamic littoral tactical environments. These larger UAVs are typically high demand/low 
density assets, retained as theater-/national-level services and requested to support 
specific missions as available. Smaller UAVs launched from maritime platforms, like 
MQ-8B Fire Scout and RQ-21A Blackjack, can provide on-demand flexibility for tactical 
commanders. For example, the smaller size of the RQ-21A allows it to maintain a 
minimal launch and recovery footprint on the deck of a ship, but its payload capacity is 
adequate enough to carry electro-optical/infrared sensors and small synthetic-aperture 
radars (Butler, 2012). This payload capacity also provides an opportunity to integrate 
more advanced communications payloads, like MANET systems. The question is: Who 
contributes this information into the planning and execution of operations in the littorals, 
and what tools enable the same? 
The Joint Concept for Command and Control of the Joint Aerial Layer Network 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015c, p. 1) provides a vision for the future of UAV relays as an 
“augmentation and extension of tactical networks using a variety of communications 
capabilities that will support operations in challenging or degraded communications 
environments within a Joint Operations Area (JOA).” This goal of JALN is to provide a 
high capacity backbone for information transfer across a JOA, functioning as a router and 
gateway to allow disparate C2 systems to access the Department of Defense Information 
Network (DODIN). The DODIN is the DOD’s global network infrastructure that 
provides warfighter access to information capabilities and support by “collecting, 
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processing, storing, disseminating and managing information” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2015a, p. 65). As a future concept, this document makes significant assumptions 
regarding the C2 of JALN. One example of this is the assertion that “network planning 
and control processes and systems will accomplish network management” (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2015c, p. 3). This, in effect, minimizes the significance of network planning and 
management in the employment of dynamic networks topologies. Overall, the focus of 
this concept is the support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) at the operational level 
and assumes the need for mission prioritization to address high-demand/low-density 
issues. 
Unmanned systems in other domains can also increase the flexibility and 
effectiveness of network-enabled operations in the littoral environment. Advances in 
unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) technologies can bring new underwater sensing 
network capabilities to the littorals. Ongoing development of Large Displacement UUVs 
(LDUUV) at Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Keyport will bring persistent 
littoral undersea surveillance into A2/AD environments. Additionally, unmanned surface 
vehicles (USV), like SeaFox, have long endurance and high payload capacity that enable 
them to serve as cross-domain network nodes and are highly suitable for a multitude of 
missions (National Defense Research Institute, 2013). The Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap does not discuss the use of UGVs as a potential network augmenter; however, 
experimentation conducted by CENETIX indicates potential usefulness in that role.  
B. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
When deciding to throw a party, no one thinks at first of the effort that 
goes into planning the party, the logistics, the cleanup—you think of the 
party itself and how much everyone will enjoy it. And certainly no one 
throws a party just for the sake of the work that it involves, but for the fun 
they expect out of it. This is not unlike the situation with networking and 
network management. (Clemm, 2006) 
Clemm’s amusing analogy provides some insight into the challenge of network 
management as an afterthought in many organizations. The importance of network 
management is receiving increasing attention due to the growing emphasis on networked 
systems within organizations. Network management becomes more relevant as the 
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complexity of the network increases (Clemm, 2006). Additionally, network and network 
management task complexity can increase as a result of the types or numbers of nodes 
involved (Frye & Cheng, 2010). The DOD’s NCW transformation highlights the 
importance of networks as an integral part of modern military operations, but the 
technical challenges of integrating new technologies in dynamic operating environments 
demand active and effective network management. 
Ren and Li (n.d.) define network management as “a service that employs a variety 
of protocols, tools, applications, and devices to assist human network managers in 
monitoring and controlling of the proper network resources, both hardware and software, 
to address service needs and the network objectives.” Network management can be 
viewed in three functional groups: network provisioning, network maintenance, and 
network/service operations (Shenoy, n.d.). Network provisioning pertains to network 
planning and design, typically concerning fixed network infrastructure. Network 
maintenance includes network installation, repairs and trouble ticket administration. 
However, the majority of day-to-day network management effort supports network 
operations. Network management systems (NMS) provide the tools used to monitor, 
configure and provision network resources, as well as a host of other functions and are 
integral to the operations of any IT enabled organization. Subramanian (2010) discusses 
network operations as it relates to a Network Operations Center (NOC) using the OSI 
FCAPS model as a foundation.  
1. FCAPS 
As part of the OSI network management model, ISO delineated five network 
management application categories for user-oriented applications that are necessary for 
NOC operations—fault, configuration, accounting, performance, and security 
management (FCAPS) (Subramanian, 2010). These categories provide a framework for 
network management applications that enable network operators to monitor and maintain 
network functionality. The FCAPS functional model provides a useful model for 
discussing network management at higher levels of abstraction. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the five functional areas of the OSI FCAPS model. 
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Table 2.   FCAPS Overview 
Fault Management Detecting, isolating, fixing and recording errors that 
occur inside the network. 
Configuration Management Maintaining accurate information on the configuration 
of the network (hardware and software) and controlling 
parameters that relate to its normal operation. 
Accounting Management User management and administration, as well as 
accounting and billing for the use of the resources and 
services. 
Performance Management Maximizing network performance relative to Quality of 
Service (QoS) provisioning and to parameters such as 
resource utilization, delay, jitter and packet loss. 
Security Management Ensuring security and safety in the network. 
Adapted from: Boutaba, R., & Polyrakis, A. (2001). Projecting FCAPS to active networks. In Proceedings of 
Enterprise Networking, Applications and Services Conference. doi: 10.1109/ENTNET.2001.981995 
While all of these areas are pertinent to network management, approaches to fault 
and configuration management must evolve to enable effective management of tactical 
networks.2 Fault management functions rely on network monitoring tools in order to 
manage and react to alarms indicated abnormal behavior in the network (Clemm, 2006). 
This process relies on a centralized management system to detect faults and locate their 
root causes so problems can be resolved quickly. Configuration management commonly 
entails middle- to long-range activities pertaining to planning and managing changes in 
software, hardware, and network provisioning. Configuration management also includes 
network topology discovery and mapping, as well as the setup of configuration 
parameters in management agents and systems (Subramanian, 2010). This is particularly 
relevant to tactical networks with constantly changing and intermittent participants. 
                                                 
2 Security management is of utmost importance to the network management of any DoD network but 
is outside the scope of this thesis. Accounting management is not directly applicable to tactical network 
operations. 
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2. Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) Service 
Architecture 
The TMN architecture was originally developed in 1986 as a means of addressing 
the interoperability of proprietary telecommunications management systems from a 
network and network element level, as well as the higher level service functions of an 
organization (Subramanian, 2010).  
The TMN model is represented in five layers. At the lowest layer, network 
elements refer to any piece of hardware on the network that can be monitored and 
managed (Gateau, 2007). The Network element management layer contains applications 
that manage network elements and may be vendor specific or proprietarily designed for a 
specific device. The network management layer provides the end-to-end view of the 
network in terms of performance, bandwidth, flow control, etc., and is vendor agnostic 
(Subramanian, 2010). The service management layer focuses on the ability of the 
network to provide services residing on that network. Finally, the business management 
layer is concerned with overarching operational requirements of the organization (e.g., 
planning, personnel, customer satisfaction, etc.)  
Gateau (2007) offers that, despite TMN’s “dizzyingly complex” (p. 34) 
governance mechanisms and documentation, the TMN service architecture provides an 
appropriate level of abstraction for broader application. This thesis leverages the TMN 
service model in this manner. Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth (2006) provide some clarity to 
the TMN service model (depicted in Figure 9) by explicating on functions of network 
operations at different layers.  
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Figure 9.  TMN Architecture of Network Operations Layers 
 
Source: Bordetsky, A., & Hayes-Roth, R. (2006). Hyper-nodes for emerging command 
and control networks: The 8th layer. In Proceedings of 11th International Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium. Retrieved from 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/11th_ICCRTS/html/papers/127.pdf 
The TMN service model builds on OSI management principles and the five 
management functional areas of FCAPS. Hierarchically, the TMN management services 
“invoke” the system management functions (FCAPS) in order to manage the network 




Figure 10.  TMN Management Services and Management Functional Areas 
 
Source: Subramanian, M. (2010). Network management: principles and practice. 
Safaribooksonline.com. Pearson Education India. Retrieved from 
http://techbus.safaribooksonline.com/book/networking/network-management/9788131727591 
It is important to note that the FCAPS management functions typically consist of 
siloed groups of applications that provide decision support to dedicated network 
operators within a NOC. Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth (2006) describe the role of the 
“Network Facilitator” who collects and interprets information from disparate DSS 
sources to determine overall network effectiveness. In other words, an array of network 
management information must be ingested and interpreted by human operators and 
becomes a pool of tacit knowledge that is refined through the acquisition of additional 
knowledge and feedback.  
3. Adaptive Network Management  
Mobile ad-hoc networking provides the foundation connecting nodes at the 
tactical edge to achieve NCW-compliant integration (Peacock, 2007); however, achieving 
robust adaptability in the face of environmental and enemy interference is critical to the 
successful implementation of the MANET. Koch and Golling (2015) assert that the 
A2/AD threat challenges NCW doctrine and that disruptions to heavily relied-upon 
communications links, (e.g. satellite communications), can degrade a force’s decision-
making capabilities. Their response, dubbed “Robust Network Centric Warfare,” 
recommends increasing adaptability from the physical layer (OSI layer 1) through the 
application layer (layer 7), via adaptable communications networks, protocols, and 
information exchange requirements.  
 31 
However, focusing on adaptability improvements for network communications is 
not adequate. The management of these networks must also be considered. 
Characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks require constant reconfiguration based on 
network performance feedback. Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth (2006), introduce the concept 
of 8th-layer adaptive network management as an extension of the 7-layer OSI model that 
uses hypernode elements capable of adapting network behavior and performance based 
on dynamic conditions and mission requirements. Gateau (2007) explores the hypernode 
concept and provides an SNMP-based Management Information Base (MIB) architecture 
for network-centric services. Increases in computing power and performance enable the 
use of proactive management algorithms. Current NMS capabilities provide for 
autonomously testing network performance and detecting QoS deterioration and 
abnormalities prior to network failure, as well as correlating and recognizing alarm 
patterns (Clemm, 2006). However, the implementation of intelligent, adaptive self-
control within networks requires further work in the realm of Case-Based Reasoning and 
other memory mechanisms to enable 8th-layer NOC functionality at the node level. 
A complementary approach to adaptive network management is provided by 
Bordetsky and Netzer (2010). In their discussion of the CENETIX Tactical Network 
Testbed, they highlight the fundamental challenge of adaptive management in tactical 
networks: 
We typically measure the performance of self-forming tactical networks 
by capturing network (IP) or data link (wireless) layer packet flows. 
However, in most practical cases we can’t bring our feedback controls 
directly to the same layer. The most feasible options available to the 
tactical NOC crew or local commanders would be limited application load 
controls (less video, still images only, voice only, etc.) at the top most 
applications layer, or node physical location (mobility) control at the 
lowest physical layer. (Bordetsky & Netzer, 2010, p. 20) 
To their point, the movement of nodes to maintain LOS or improve signal strength and 
the manipulation of application load within the network indicate the increased 
significance of configuration management in MANET, addressed in a later section. 
Therefore, the combination of application load management and node mobility form the 
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nexus of active MANET configuration management. Figure 11 illustrates how a NOC 
using this adaptive management approach would interact with the network.  
Figure 11.  Layers of Adaptation for Maritime MANET 
 
Source: Bordetsky, A., & Netzer, D. (2010). Testbed for tactical networking and 
collaboration. The International C2 Journal, 4(3). Retrieved from http://www.dod 
ccrp.org/files/IC2J_v4n3_B_Bordetsky.pdf 
4. Mesh Networks 
The description of a mesh network as flexible, self-forming, self-healing, and 
eventually self-organizing originates from graph theory: a pure mesh network topology is 
described as a complete or fully interconnected graph (Bordetsky et al., n.d.). Fully 
connected mesh topologies provide redundant interconnections and fault tolerance within 
a network but are expensive and difficult to accomplish. Partial-mesh topologies provide 
a realistic approach to redundancy and interconnectivity for dynamic nodes by providing 
multiple alternative routes without the cost of a full mesh topology, as shown in 
Figure 12.  
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Figure 12.  Full Mesh versus Partial Mesh Topology 
 
 
From the computer and information networking perspective, mesh networking 
could take place at any layer of network functionality and can be understood in terms of 
the OSI 7-layer hierarchy. Bordetsky et al. (2015) explain: 
At the lowest physical layer populated by moving assets such as ships, 
vehicles, and their antennas, it could be viewed as a directional or physical 
network of highly dynamic components. At layer 3, the Internet layer, it is 
a typical IP space mesh of logical paths, which are alternated and 
recalculated by routers, subject to changing conditions in node mobility as 
well as application performance. At layer 7, a similar mesh behavior could 
be viewed as a complete graph of application flows, in which the flows are 
swiftly adjusted in response to a changing situational awareness/decision 
support process in a shared C2 cycle. (p. 3) 
While mesh networking can manifest at various layers, approaches can be categorized 
into physical layer implementation (e.g., radios), the network itself, and the social 
networks of users interacting with them.  
a. MANET 
The characteristics of MANET make them highly suitable for networks at the 
tactical edge. MANET technologies allow users to collaborate more easily and attain 
better situational awareness than ever before—“this increased situational awareness is the 
cornerstone enabling capability for the NCW tenets of cooperative engagement and self-
synchronization” (Peacock, 2007, p. 13). The multi-hop nature of MANET allows the 
extension of networks beyond line-of-sight and in areas where fixed infrastructure is not 
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in place. Initial overhead and resource requirements are reduced due to the 
decentralization and dynamic routing capabilities of MANET systems. Ongoing 
development of Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) seeks to overcome issues associated 
with disconnected or intermittent connectivity, allowing nodes to store and forward 
packets of information opportunistically between disconnected nodes (Team CASA, 
2014). 
MANETs are different from Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) in a number of 
ways. Although they are both multi-hop approaches to networking, key differences 
include reliance on infrastructure, destination of traffic flows, and mobility (Sichitiu, 
2006). WMN require a multi-tiered infrastructure consisting of users, mesh routers, and 
gateways with most traffic across exchanged across the network via user-to-gateway 
interface. Connectivity across WMN usually occurs at layer 3 as a result. Network traffic 
on MANETs can include gateways for access outside of the network but the majority of 
network traffic is peer-to-peer (layer 2). The ad-hoc nature and dynamic node mobility of 
MANET mean that most instances are effectively partial mesh topologies.  
b. Technologies  
Research on near-shore mesh networks has great potential to increase tactical 
advantage of naval forces operating in the littorals. Pathmasuntharam et al. (2008) 
analyze low-cost, high-bandwidth solutions for ship-to-ship/shore mesh networking as a 
communication path to replace or complement satellite communications in near-shore 
commercial maritime applications. Their research focuses primarily on safety-of-
navigation, providing two-way voice/data communications and Internet access to ships 
transiting narrow channels and close to shorelines (Pathmasuntharam et al., 2008). The 
International Telecommunications Union–Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) report 
M.2202 (2011) discusses additional research regarding commercial maritime broadband 
wireless mesh networks. In this report, ITU-R outlines various hardware and protocol 
challenges faced by maritime mesh networks but maintains that the approach is feasible 
given further efforts to standardize mesh protocols for maritime usage 
(Radiocommunication Sector of International Telecommunication Union, 2011). While 
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these papers primarily focus on WMN, the key issues they address and the challenges 
they identify are also relevant to MANET implementation for maritime networks.  
As these standards continue to be developed, several communication technology 
companies have attempted to bridge the gap between the commercial and tactical realms. 
Companies such as Trellisware, Harris, and Persistent Systems have developed 
proprietary MANET technologies directly intended for military operations in tactical 
environments ashore and afloat.  
A prime example of modern MANET technology is the Wave Relay system 
produced by Persistent Systems. Wave Relay is a suite of intelligent MANET radios that 
includes compact handhelds and larger units for vehicles or fixed sites. The 
experimentation outlined in Chapter III leveraged this technology as a surrogate 
representing more powerful MANET systems that could be implemented in littoral 
tactical networks. 
CENETIX research utilizes three Wave Relay radio models for experimentation: 
the Man-Portable Unit (MPU) 3; the MPU4; and, the Quad Radio router. Table 3 
provides a comparison of these systems. 
Table 3.   Quad Radio, MPU3, and MPU4 Specification Comparison 
 
Adapted from: Persistent Systems. (2014). Wave relay capability specifications sheet. Retrieved February 
7, 2016, from http://www.persistentsystems.com/pdf/WaveRelay_ Capability_SpecSheet.pdf 
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CENETIX researchers found the greater power and functionality of the Quad 
Radios and MPU3s apposite for fixed mounting on larger vessels and structures ashore. 
The compact size of the MPU4 allowed mobile operators aboard smaller vessels to access 
SA tools and reach-back elements through the MANET.  
5. MANET Management 
The management of tactical networks presents a much different problem set than 
that faced by managers of contemporary fixed networks. Tactical networks typically 
require information exchanges for short durations, whereas administrative networks 
require continuous operation for indefinite periods (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). Kidston 
and Kunz (2008) assert that, as compared to contemporary networks with high data rates 
and fixed topologies, maritime MANETs “engender a novel combination of management 
challenges” (p. 164). These challenges include:  
• Commercial NMS are not directly compatible with MANET systems;  
• The heterogeneity of tactical communications systems affects 
interoperability;  
• Rapid reconfiguration is a persistent requirement during MANET 
operation due to changes in mission requirements and operational needs;  
• Disconnected, intermittent and limited communications environments 
results in high error rates and variable bandwidth;  
• Limited access to skilled network operators;  
• Dynamic network topologies and related difficulties due to MANET 
mobility; 
• Security concerns due to the nature of RF communications.3 
SNMP is the primary means of network performance monitoring used by 
commercial NMS (Subramanian, 2010). Many MANET systems lack SNMP 
functionality; instead, these systems utilize Application Program Interfaces (API) for 
access to system performance information. However, the diverse ecosystem of 
                                                 
3 Addressing network security and system vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
they are of the utmost importance, especially when considering a tactical environment with sophisticated 
adversaries who can inject, manipulate or otherwise interfere with communications in the RF spectrum. 
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communications systems that will be operating in the tactical environment requires an 
NMS that can consolidate, normalize and process information from multiple source types 
that can include API, SNMP and other network management communications schemas.  
The dynamism and fluidity of tactical networks challenge traditional network 
management paradigms; however, the fundamental underpinnings of network 
management models are useful for tailoring network management systems and 
approaches to meet operational needs. The FCAPS model used for network management 
for traditional wired networks is relevant; however, management services must adapt to 
compensate for the challenges of the maritime environment.  
Network life cycle phases of wired networks are linear with each phase separated 
in time. Using CISCO’s Network Management Reference Architecture (2008) as an 
example; the phases of the Prepare, Plan, Design, Implement, Operate, and Optimize 
(PPDIO) life cycle can be reduced to two—Design and Operational. Accounting and 
security aside, configuration activities typically occur during the design phase. Whereas, 
the principle line of effort in the operational phase of wired networks goes toward fault 
management and performance optimization. The constantly changing and adaptive nature 
of MANET forces these functions to occur contemporaneously. Management functions 
now become intertwined and interconnected; changes in configuration immediately 
manifest in changes in performance and variations in performance drive network re-
configuration. 
The domains of MANET management must reflect the shift in emphasis from a 
disjointed, primarily linear approach to a more integrated model. Based on the FCAPS 
framework, Kidston and Kunz (2008) offer the following critical management areas: 
configure, heal, optimize, monitor, and protect—subsequently referred to as the CHOMP 
model, illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  CHOMP Model 
 
Adapted from: Kidston, D., & Kunz, T. (2008). Challenges and opportunities in managing 
maritime networks. Communications Magazine, 46(10), 162–168. doi: 10.1109/ 
MCOM.2008.4644135 
The functions of configuration and monitoring are both well engrained in traditional 
wired-network management approaches (Kidston & Kunz, 2008). However, the effects of 
mobility, resource scarcity/constraints, and both physical and cyber clutter are unique to 
the realm of tactical networks. Kidston and Kunz (2008) go on to explain with regards to 
healing and optimization that: 
network and application self-(re)configuration…involves managing the 
entire life cycle of the network from initial configuration (initialization) to 
the application of new operational rules (evolution), to reconfiguration of 
devices upon failures (robustness),4 and finally, discovery and 
configuration of new (and related) devices as they become available 
(adaptation). (p. 165) 
It might be inferred that healing and optimization therefore belong to an overarching 
category of “re-configuration” which supports the evolution, robustness and adaptation of 
the tactical network after initial configuration, although they are described by Kidston 
and Kunz as discrete, complementary activities.  
The discovery and configuration of new nodes as they join the network poses 
potential technological challenges (e.g., out-of-band configuration) but also provides 
opportunities for network scalability. It may be possible to enhance network coverage by 
                                                 
4 The reconfiguration of failed devices referred to by Kidston and Kunz can also refer to interfaces, 
application services, or other similar elements. 
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taking advantage of friendly, MANET-equipped vessels transiting the operating area 
even if they are not organic to the AFP or group of assets under the Commander’s 
purview.  
This approach provides a unique, relevant and useful model when considering the 
management of maritime MANET. These critical management areas provide the 
foundational elements for the development of a robust and holistic NMS solution for the 
tactical maritime MANET. This thesis uses these management areas as a framework and 
for further analysis in Chapter IV. 
6. Network Operations Tools Used For CENETIX Experimentation 
CENETIX offers a unique venue for the exploration of littoral-centric C2 and 
mesh networking concepts. The ability of the CENETIX testbed to extend its cyber-
physical environment through a global collaborative network offers a plethora of tools, 
including network management, plug-and-play man-machine interfaces, and data 
collection capabilities to experiment sites around the world. Another benefit of using an 
extension of the testbed environment is the ability to capture and replay experiment 
scenarios to enable seamless continuity in the transfer of research knowledge to 
subsequent testing and CONOPS development.  
CENETIX field experimentation exploring littoral network management in 2015 
leveraged three systems for the deployment and management of tactical networks: 
CENETIX SA Server, Wave Relay Management Interface, and the CodeMettle Network 
Service Orchestrator.  
a. CENETIX SA Server 
CENETIX experimentation relies on organically developed web services 
accessible via the CENETIX web portal. The CENETIX SA Server is an organically 
developed situational awareness sharing system, purpose-built to provide the CENETIX 
NOC with a common operating picture during field experiments. Using Google Earth as a 
platform, the CENETIX SA Server stores mobile device locational information 
accessible from the CENETIX portal in Keyhole Markup Language (KML) format. This 
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allows KML subscribers to view the locations of these devices in Google Earth and 
supports the use of track history and scenario replay available in the program. Radios 
within the network are configured to transmit Cursor-on-Target (CoT) messages to the 
CENETIX SA Server. The GPS locational data contained in the CoT messages is stored 
and processed at the CENETIX SA server. This location data is subsequently used to plot 
3-D location information for each node. The locational data stored on this server 
integrates GPS data transmitted directly to the server from other mobile devices on the 
testbed. PLI stored by the SA Server is visible to subscribers as track history and can be 
replayed from the CENETIX Web Portal. In addition to the SA Server, the CENETIX 
web portal also hosts Observer Notepad for text notation, chat, and file sharing, as well as 
the VC1 Video Conferencing tool for streaming video, used during all experiment phases. 
Data generated locally flows through the CENETIX Resource Portal to remote 
CENETIX servers located on the NPS campus for display/dissemination. Figure 14 
shows the CENETIX Resource Portal tools in use. 




b. Wave Relay Management Interface 
The Wave Relay Web Management Interface enables users to configure and 
monitor radio units via a web browser. All radio functionality is only accessible through 
the web interface due to the lack of external Wave Relay radio controls. The Web 
Management Interface sorts configuration and monitoring functions into five tabs: node 
status, node configuration, network status, network configuration, and security. The 
Wave Relay Management Interface is shown in Figure 15. 
Figure 15.  Wave Relay Management Interface 
 
 
The “node status” tab provides node-specific information for the specific radio 
that the user is accessing based on the IP address used. This includes hardware and 
software information, the status of connected neighbor nodes, GPS status, traffic load, 
and other node monitoring information. This information is consolidated under the 
 42 
“network status” tab for all radios—information from each radio is collected, combined 
and displayed textually on one page. Figure 16 gives an example of the network 
performance information visible on the Wave Relay Management Interface. 
Figure 16.  Examples of Network Performance Information Available on 
Wave Relay Management Interface 
 
 
“Node configuration” provides options for managing the accessed node and 
includes settings for MANET routing, radio, access point, GPS, Ethernet, and a host of 
other configuration functionalities. The “network configuration” tab allows users to 
change the nodes included in network-wide configuration changes; changes to default 
settings for all radios in the network can also be adjusted on this tab. 
Security functionality is also accessible through the web interface. The “Security” 
tab provides the ability to set a key, configure encryption settings, zeroize the key on the 




c. CodeMettle Network Service Orchestrator (NSO) 
The CodeMettle system provides a network agnostic approach to the management 
of heterogeneous networked assets, including the standards and protocols used by those 
assets. The NSO is an open-source, open-architecture system that is rapidly deployable 
across any hybrid network and offers a browser and mobile-based user interface that is 
fully configurable. Network performance information is collected, normalized, and stored 
in an SQL database. The unified dashboard allows for network data from any 
management functional area to be displayed, textually or graphically, on a single 
interface. The CodeMettle dashboard tailored for use during CENETIX experimentation 
is shown in Figure 17. 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 45 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Two CENETIX field experiments were conducted in 2015. The NATO Maritime 
Interdiction Operations Training Center in Souda Bay, Crete hosted a June 2015 research 
event. A second experiment in October 2015 took place in San Francisco Bay, California. 
The experiments leveraged mesh-networking technologies to enable the sharing of 
situational awareness in combined and interagency operations. Although these 
experiments focused on MIO and CWMD operations, lessons learned from these events 
are broadly applicable to operations throughout the littoral domain.  
While the overall research design took place across the execution of two disparate 
experiment events, each experiment featured key elements that contributed to subsequent 
testing. The CENETIX MIO experiment in June 2015 focused on locational data sharing 
across a local mesh network architecture connected to the CENETIX testbed through a 
local gateway and included unmanned systems functioning as network relay nodes. The 
October 2015 CENETIX CWMD experimentation expanded the local mesh network 
architecture in a littoral environment. A key objective for this experiment was the 
management and monitoring of the hybrid mesh network. This hybrid architecture 
leveraged a combination of mesh networks and satellite communications systems to 
integrate unmanned ground and undersea vehicles as data producers within the 
CENETIX testbed ecosystem. 
The planning and execution of these field experiments provided the critical 
underpinnings for the incremental development of littoral mesh network management 
operations. In line with the experiment campaign process explained in the Code of Best 
Practice for Experimentation by Alberts (2002), the goal of this research is to frame an 
initial concept for littoral mesh network management operations and to provide an 
overview of the CENETIX discovery experimentation. Figure 18 illustrates the logical 




Figure 18.  Experiment Campaigns 
 
Adapted from Alberts, D. S. (2002). Code of best practice: experimentation. Washington, 
DC: CCRP. 
Several research phases executed over the course of these two events analyzed the 
potential of mesh network management operations in the littoral domain. They were 
broken up into the following phases: 
Phase 1—Souda Bay, June 2015 
1. Configure, bench test, and deploy mobile ad hoc networking technologies 
in an experimentation testbed environment;  
2. Implement and test situational awareness / data-sharing software using 3D 
visualization (e.g. CENETIX SA Server, Wave Relay KML); 
3. Integrate unmanned systems as relay nodes in the network; 
4. Implement and test Wave Relay Management Interface capabilities for 
MANET management in a littoral environment. 
Phase 2—San Francisco Bay, October 2015 
5. Integration of unmanned systems as data producers in the network; 
6. Tailor network management software to provide a decision-support 
component for controlling physical layer topology and performance 
(CodeMettle); 
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7. Test network management software within the hybrid mesh testbed 
architecture.  
These steps provide the basic outline for the methodology and results presented in 
this thesis. Exploration of unmanned system applications and mesh network 
orchestration/management systems in this research are predicated on the implementation 
of a littoral mesh network architecture. Additionally, experimentation with systems 
intended to improve situational awareness contributed to the development of the mesh 
network orchestration concept.  
A. CENETIX-NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS 
TRAINING CENTER (NMIOTC) EXPERIMENTATION (JUNE 2015) 
The June 2015 experiment focused on shared situational awareness among partner 
nations as part of a coalition force conducting maritime interception operations in Souda 
Bay, Crete. In this case, situational awareness information was comprised of Position 
Location Information (PLI), voice, chat, and video feeds generated by each patrolling 
vessel. Figure 1 illustrates the overall scheme of maneuver for the experiment. Vessels 
from countries “A” and “B” were equipped with mesh radios attached to Panasonic CF-
52 laptops or handheld mobile devices. Using these devices, users were able to access 
real-time track information, chat and video streams that provided them the ability to 
quickly identify and intercept a target vessel crossing a notional jurisdictional boundary. 
1. Mesh Network Deployment 
For the purposes of CENETIX testing and experimentation, Persistent System’s 
Wave Relay MPU-3 and MPU-4 Radio units provided the basic mesh architecture. The 
high throughput, reliability, and compatibility with other CENETIX testbed elements 
prompted the selection of these systems. The CENETIX research team developed a 
general CONOPS and scheme of maneuver for each of the experiments. These plans 
guided the generation of network diagrams. Network topologies supported several 
disparate test sets to provide the required flexibility to support needs of each system. 
Figures 19 depicts the basic network topology for the June 2015 experiment. 
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Configuration and network monitoring for each node was available through the 
web browser-based Wave Relay Management Interface. Initial Wave Relay radio 
implementation required manual configuration of individual radios. For example, radios 
had to have matching security keys in order to join the mesh network. Additionally, 
several radios were set up to serve as wireless access points allowing mobile devices to 
share data and access the CENETIX-designed Observer’s Notepad collaboration tool. 
Once radio configuration was complete, a full connection test was conducted between 
each radio to ensure proper setup. Channel selection for radio frequencies was limited to 
the 2312–2507 MHz range due to equipment constraints. However, the specifications for 
this Persistent Systems WR-RAD-12 radio model allowed the use of 2 watt transmit 
output power, which improved radio performance during experimentation. All other radio 
configurations were set to default.  
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2. Situational Awareness and Data Sharing 
In order to leverage the CENETIX web portal tools, each radio was configured to 
transmit Cursor-on-Target (CoT) messages to the CENETIX SA Server. The GPS 
locational data contained in the CoT messages was stored and processed at the CENETIX 
SA server. This location data was used to plot 3-D location information for each node.  
As stated in Chapter II, the locational data stored on this server integrates GPS 
data transmitted directly to the server from other mobile devices on the testbed. PLI 
stored by the SA Server is visible to subscribers as track history and can be replayed from 
the CENETIX Web Portal. Users were able to access SA Server tools, and utilize other 
CENETIX web portal functionality; these included Observer Notepad for text notation, 
chat, and file sharing, as well as the VC1 Video Conferencing tool for streaming video. 
These tools were used during all experiment phases. Data generated locally flowed 
through the CENETIX Resource Portal to remote CENETIX servers located on the NPS 
campus for display/dissemination. Laptop nodes used Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
connections to access this information from the Portal through the Internet Connection 
Sharing (ICS) gateway. VPN tunneling enabled direct access to streaming video feeds 
and CoT data visualizations from the CENETIX servers. Figure 20 shows the CENETIX 
Resource Portal tools in use. 
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Figure 20.  CENETIX Resource Portal Tools 
 
 
The Wave Relay Management Interface provides a similar situational awareness 
tool to the one hosted by the CENETIX SA Server. User nodes connected directly to the 
Wave Relay mesh network can subscribe to a KML feed via the Management Interface. 
When viewed using Google Earth, node PLI is visible as well as the mesh data links 
connecting each node (depicted in Figure 21). The Wave Relay Management Interface 
does not store PLI so track history is not available to the user. The colors of the visible 
data links indicate performance based on SNR, however there is no legend correlating 
SNR level to the respective color indicator: 
1. Red = poor 
2. Yellow = acceptable 
3. Green = good 
4. Blue = excellent 
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Figure 21.  Wave Relay Management Interface KML Viewed in Google Earth 
 
 
3. Unmanned System Integration (Relay Node) 
The CENETIX testbed environment is well suited for testing the integration of 
unmanned systems in littoral operations. CENETIX experimentation in June 2015 
explored several use-cases for unmanned vehicles within a littoral operating environment, 
focusing on their use as relay nodes. Coordination of these experiments came from the 
CENETIX Network Operations Center located at NMIOTC Headquarters in Souda Bay, 
Crete, approximately 2 miles northwest of Nisida Souda Island. This allowed 
investigators the ability to monitor network operations and information flows through 
different phases of each experiment. Additionally, the testbed provided a centralized C2 
location for unmanned system testing.  
Unmanned aerial vehicles in the June 2015 experiment demonstrated the use of 
aerial assets to bolster mesh network coverage over geographic obstacles in the littoral 
environment. This network relay link allowed boarding teams on the Hellenic Navy’s 
training vessel (ex-Aris) to have reachback connectivity for the nuclear detection sensors 
being used to search the target ship. Figure 22 depicts the relative location of the UAV.  
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Figure 22.  Relative Location of Hellenic Navy UAV Flight Path 
 
 
System design for the Hellenic Navy UAV required direct control of the aircraft 
from a ground station through a point-to-point RF link. However, the aircraft was 
outfitted with an MPU-4 radio that served as a connecting node between radios located 
on the southern portion of Nisida Souda Island and on the ex-Aris training vessel. Users 
on onboard ex-Aris were not in LOS of the NOC, so the island and UAV relays provided 
connectivity for testing in that location. The small size of the UAV (illustrated in Figure 
23) allowed its launch from the pier adjacent to ex-Aris.  
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Figure 23.  Hellenic Navy UAV Fitted with MPU-4 Radio 
 
 
Once airborne, the UAV executed a circular holding pattern directly over the northern 
end of Nisida Souda Island. This holding pattern allowed the radio to relay network 
traffic between nodes on ex-Aris and simulated Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) nodes 
on Nisida Souda Island. UAV testing was limited due to mechanical failures onboard the 
aircraft.  
Simulation of UGV relay nodes also facilitated the exploration of unmanned 
systems operating in tandem to improve mesh network performance. Two stationary 
nodes were placed on accessible structures located at high points along the southern edge 
of the island. The placement of these nodes was conceptually based on areas accessible to 
UGVs deployed to provide semi-fixed relay coverage. Physical location of East and West 
Relays are visible in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24.  Relative Locations of East and West Relays 
 
 
Due to the mechanical failure of the UAV, boarding teams in ex-Aris were not 
able to directly connect into the mesh network relays on Nisida Souda Island or at 
NMIOTC. To compensate for this, two ship nodes were directed by the NOC to 
maneuver into position to act as relay nodes. These nodes are labeled as “CountryA” and 
“CountryB” in Figure 25. Identifying an adequate location for the repositioned nodes was 
accomplished using the Wave Relay Management Interface and the Google Earth KML 
to view and verify connectivity was reestablished. Once the nodes were in place, links to 
ex-Aris were restored; however, link quality remained relatively degraded. 
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4. MANET Management with Wave Relay Management Interface 
The Wave Relay Management Interface provides access to a variety of network 
performance data, including network traffic load at each node, signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR) between nodes, and other information. Researchers in the NOC utilized a 
combination of the tools available on the Management Interface in conjunction with the 
3-D visualization and VC1 video conferencing tool. This was due to the inability of the 
Wave Relay Management Interface to monitor application performance or notify NOC 
personnel if network performance was degraded or contact with network nodes was lost. 
As a result, the NOC relied primarily on the “MANET Monitor” function (shown in 
Figure 26), as well as visual cues from the Google Earth WR KML and VC1 video feeds 
that indicated network performance issues.  
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Figure 26.  Wave Relay Management Interface MANET Monitor 
 
 
B. CENETIX COUNTER-WMD EXPERIMENT (OCTOBER 2015) 
October 2015 experimentation integrated knowledge collected from the June 2015 
experiment and explored distributed knowledge sharing in a Counter-WMD scenario. A 
primary focus of this experiment was the use of distributed assets across the CENETIX 
backbone network, including unmanned ground and underwater vehicles. The Operations 
Center located at the USCG Station Yerba Buena in San Francisco Bay provided a 
centralized location for operational C2 and network management. This location made it a 
suitable surrogate for a shipboard Littoral Operations Center. Internet connectivity 
through the USCG network provided access to the CENETIX network. Additionally, a 
Wave Relay Quad Radio router with a sector antenna was installed on the 
communications tower adjacent to the building. This mesh radio connected maritime 
assets in San Francisco Bay to the Operations Center and acted as a gateway to enable 
their access to the CENETIX Network. The basic network topology for the San Francisco 
Bay experiment is shown in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27.  SF Bay CWMD Experiment Basic Network Topology 
 
 
1. Unmanned Systems Integration (Data Producer) 
The use of unmanned systems in the October 2015 experiment shifted from 
network relays to data producers within the littoral testbed network. This experiment 
focused on the use of ground vehicles for site exploitation and radiological/nuclear 
material detection, as well as the use of underwater vehicles for search and diver cueing.  
The CENETIX RMP-400 Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) was equipped with 
an Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM) radiological/nuclear detection device 
provided by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). UGV control relied on 
waypoint entry using a remote interface operated from the Yerba Buena Island NOC. 
Once the waypoints were selected and the “mission execute” command sent, the UGV 
navigated to each of the defined waypoints. Video streaming provided the operator with 




Figure 28.  RMP-400 Mission Control Interface 
 
 
Using a live radiological source from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories 
(LLNL), detection data collected by the ARAM system were processed by the RMP-
400’s onboard computer. These data were automatically posted to the CENETIX server 
for reachback analysis. Server connectivity was established through a local Wave Relay 
network connected to a ViaSat terminal gateway. Figure 29 shows the RMP-400 in action 
at LLNL Site 300. 




CENETIX partnered with Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Keyport, 
Washington to test the underwater diver communication system designed by NPS. This is 
the first CENETIX experiment exploring the concept on an unmanned underwater 
vehicle providing data directly to divers operating underwater, without the need to return 
to the surface for data connectivity. At the time of the October 2015 experiment, systems 
allowing 360-degree underwater video collection with onboard UUV systems were still 
under development. NUWC Keyport’s VideoRay remotely operated vehicle (ROV) 
provided a surrogate platform.  
A pelican case, representing a parasite box containing illicit materials, was 
submerged adjacent to the NUWC Keyport pier. ROV operators were directed by the 
NOC to search for the parasite box. Once found, imagery of the parasite box was 
transmitted directly to divers in San Francisco Bay. Video taken by the ROV was piped 
through the CENETIX Resource Portal video streaming tool. Divers viewed screenshots 
of the video feed, received text commands, and were able to upload pictures to the NOC 
through the CENETIX-developed Networking-by-Touch (NbT) system. This allowed the 
NOC to direct divers to confirm the presence of the parasite box and provide instructions 
for subsequent actions from reachback experts. Figure 30 shows the video stream from 
the NUWC Keyport ROV.  
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Figure 30.  NUWC Keyport ROV and Video Stream through CENETIX Portal 
 
 
2. CodeMettle Network Service Orchestrator Deployment  
Littoral operations are supported by an integrated network of manned and 
unmanned platforms and systems. These nodes are connected via a hybrid network 
including satellite, radio, and Ethernet. However, while the network nodes are well 
integrated, often the management of these nodes is disparate based on technology, 
function, or vendor. That is, network operators currently must use multiple management 
tools to address different aspects of the network and must manually aggregate the data to 
create a single picture of the network, or non-real-time situational awareness. 
In collaboration with CodeMettle LLC, network services and elements resident in 
the CENETIX testbed environment enabled the development of a tailored, unified 
network management dashboard. The CodeMettle Network Service Orchestrator (NSO) 
dashboard provides centralized awareness and management of network assets, combining 
geo-location information, IP traffic performance, and the ability to better visualize 
dynamic mesh topologies.  
Situational awareness information was required by the NOC not only for the 
tactical MANET, but also the CENETIX backbone that supported the experiment. As 
CodeMettle was informed of the exercise 5 calendar days before the experiment, the 
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agility of the tool’s deployment was an added factor influencing the experiment’s results. 
The following sections will describe how CodeMettle NSO was integrated into the 
experiment and obtained, processed, and presented real-time network situational 
awareness. 
a. Data Acquisition 
The first step in designing the unified dashboard interface was to determine what 
information is relevant at the tactical level from a cyber-physical maneuver perspective 
and how to present it to the user. The open-architecture design of the CodeMettle NSO 
allows the integration of disparate network management protocols into a single interface. 
The foundation of network management and common situational awareness is 
data acquisition from the network and the equipment. CodeMettle created simple data 
“translator” scripts to access data from the hybrid network and normalize the disparate 
data from different technologies and vendors into a common data model. Prior to the 
experiment, NPS and CodeMettle investigators outlined various requirements for the 
NSO dashboard that included: 
• Node Details 
• Geographical display of node PLI 
• Graphical representation of data links between nodes 
• Radio performance information (e.g. SNR) 
• IP traffic load and network quality 
• Node faults 
• Track history and dashboard replay 
While the CodeMettle NSO can access data using any API, for this experiment 
the following interfaces were used to collect data supporting these requirements: 
• SNMP: IP infrastructure including routers, switches, servers 
• Web-queries: MANET radios 
• Network probes: link latency and quality 
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An umbrella management tool must be flexible and should handle network data in 
the most efficient way. For example, while Wave Relay MPU-4 radios have an onboard 
management API that allows routers to be configured and monitored using an HTTPS 
interface, CodeMettle obtained data from the Wave Relay Management Interface web 
page served by the radios. With limited time and operators’ experience interpreting the 
web pages, probing the same pages eliminated the step of processing an unfamiliar data 
format. Only when this data was normalized in a common model was intelligence able to 
be gained via data correlation and visualization. 
Development of the CodeMettle NSO dashboard did not include integration of 
radio configuration, over-the-air-rekey (OTAR), or over-the-air–zeroize (OTAZ) 
capabilities. However, these functions are available through the Wave Relay API and 
could be integrated into the CodeMettle NSO. As the first implementation of this system 
in the CENETIX testbed, the CodeMettle NSO map display was limited to 2-D graphics, 
however, 3-D map visualization could be incorporated in future testing. 
b. Data Processing 
The raw data must be processed and correlated based on the network and 
mission’s situational awareness requirements. For the October 2015 experiment, the 
primary objective was to correlate geographic position of assets to network quality during 
the tactical maneuvers, and secondarily to monitor the health and quality of the 
supporting backbone network. To accomplish this, CodeMettle correlated geo-positioning 
data from the MANET radios with network quality and traffic through the IP 
infrastructure and radio network.  
Using the CodeMettle NSO, researchers conducted network discovery to identify 
active nodes and interfaces. The testbed contained both Wave Relay and standard 
network equipment such as laptops, computers, and routers. The CodeMettle system 
consolidated network performance, configuration and fault information into a single, 
unified and intuitive dashboard. Users were able to reconfigure the dashboard to display 
information pertinent to operations and mission requirements. 
  
 63 
c. Data Visualization 
Using configurable dashboards and input from the researchers, CodeMettle NSO 
presented real-time situational awareness of the tactical and backbone network. In past 
experiments, correlating geo-position with network performance required three separate 
tools that were consolidated into the CodeMettle platform for the October 2015 CWMD 
experiment. The dashboard depicted in Figure 31 was created for the CENETIX 
backbone network that supported the experiment. 




A tactical dashboard was also created to provide situational awareness during the 
exercise (shown in Figure 32). This dashboard correlated geo-position to network 
performance in the dynamic MANET network as the manned and unmanned systems 
manuvered for the exercise. The bottom left and bottom center dashboard components are 
an excellent example of transform complex network data into intelligence with intuitive 
visualization. With a glance, the network operator can visualize the geo-position of 
network nodes in the bottom-left map and easily determine quality of connectivity to 
neighbors nodes in a radar chart; the network operator can easily tell which nodes have 
degraded connectivity and inform them to move closer to a network node to increase 
quality. Access to this visualization enabled the proactive use of node placement and 
resource allocation to support network requirements. 





For this experiment, the focus was on MANET operations between six U.S. Coast 
Guard Auxiliary boats and a San Francisco Police maritime patrol. The MANET enabled 
users’ access to CENETIX testbed tools, streaming video, and collaboration across the 
network. Changes in network performance were immediately visible on the dashboard as 
the topology changed due to node mobility. This information was visible on the map 
display that also provided a visual representation of network topology. In addition, radio 
and interface traffic indicated which nodes were generating the most flow across the 
network. Ultimately, the NSO interface provided this information in a much more robust 
and richer fashion than extant tools and bridged the gap between MANET and traditional 
network management functions. Despite a determined effort by the CodeMettle team, 
data collection and dashboard replay functionality for post-mission or post-failure 
analysis were not available for testing.  
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IV. EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, this chapter provides 
significant observations and key takeaways from the June and October 2015 
experimentations. Additionally, this chapter touches on the littoral scenario introduced in 
Chapter I and analyzes the implications of CENETIX field experimentation results on 
this vignette through the lens of the concepts and theories outlined in Chapter II.  
A. CENETIX NMIOTC EXPERIMENTATION (JUNE 2015) 
OBSERVATIONS 
As discussed in Chapter III, the June 2015 experiment focused on shared 
situational awareness among partner nations as part of a coalition force conducting 
maritime interception operations in Souda Bay, Crete. This involved the deployment and 
management of a Wave Relay MANET that included the use of unmanned vehicles as 
network relays. Network operators were able to monitor network performance via the 
Wave Relay Management Interface. The Wave Relay and CENETIX SA Server were 
used to provide network operators with situational awareness information relevant for 
network management. This section outlines the observations and conclusions based on 
the June 2015 NMIOTC experiment. 
It was observed during this experiment that Wave Relay’s onboard management 
interface provided relevant MPU node configuration and node/network performance 
information. However, this information was located on several different tabs of the 
interface and only available in text format. The lack of a unified interface with illustrative 
graphics hampered the network operator’s ability to quickly identify, correlate and assess 
changes in network performance. Additionally, the Wave Relay Management Interface 
lacks fault detection functionality: issues within the network were not explicitly visible to 
the network manager. Mesh radio performance during the experiment was limited due to 
a radio-antenna mismatch—two radios were identified to have incompatible antennas 
following the experiment. This impacted radio performance, however, these issues were 
not apparent to the NOC during the event.  
 68 
The Wave Relay Management System is limited solely to Wave Relay radio 
nodes. Additional tools were necessary to monitor the performance of attached devices 
and other elements of the network. Conventional network management systems are not 
compatible with MANET technologies, so network managers were limited to basic ICMP 
functions (e.g., pinging) to verify connectivity with these devices (Figure 33).  
Figure 33.  Node Ping Graph Monitoring Network Connectivity for both 
MANET and Non-MANET devices  
 
 
In addition to monitoring ICMP functions, network operators visually gauged the 
status the network connection by watching the quality of video being transferred through 
the CENETIX Portal via the VC1 video conference room (shown in Figure 34).  
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This experiment was limited to several small patrol boats, so the scale of the 
experiment was manageable. However, it was apparent that network management 
limitations would have a tremendous impact as the scale and complexity of the network 
increased with the number of nodes and types of networked assets in future experiments. 
A key enabler for NOC personnel to identify and mitigate issues caused by cyber 
and physical clutter were the 3-D visualization tools available through the SA Server and 
the Wave Relay KML. In this case, the presence of terrain (Nisida Souda Island) impeded 
LOS communications between two groups of distributed nodes. The use of Google Earth, 
combined with the Wave Relay KML overlay, gave NOC personnel the ability to 
correlate the connectivity loss to the presence of physical clutter and obstructions that 
created interference. The 3-D visualization subsequently gave network operators the 
ability to optimize the placement of a network relay node and provided immediate 
feedback based on the network topology reconfiguration. In this case, the feedback was 
based on the NOC’s view of the “MANET Monitor” tab of the Wave Relay Management 
Interface (Figure 35). This image was taken when the patrol boats from Country A and B 
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were ordered by the NOC to intercept the target vessel. This view of the Management 
Interface informed NOC personnel that connectivity had been lost with CNTX-MPU-7 
(the MPU-4 radio assigned the boarding team aboard ex-Aris). 
Figure 35.  MANET Monitor and Map View during Patrol Boat Maneuver in 
Souda Bay, Crete 
 
 
Country A and Country B vessels were directed to continue their interception and 
boarding of the target vessel. As the patrol vessels moved out of the blockage zone 
caused by the island, NOC personnel were able to see the rediscovery of CNTX-MPU-7 
(depicted in Figure 36).  
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The Wave Relay Management Interface does not store network performance 
information so there was no manufacturer-provided solution to view track history via 
Google Earth 3D visualization. Using the CENETIX SA server, NOC personnel were 
able to view track history and replay this information for analysis. The ability to view and 
replay track history enabled network operators to better localize and correlate the causes 
of network performance fluctuations as part of post-mission or post-failure analysis. 
The integration of unmanned systems during the June 2015 experiment 
significantly contributed to the concepts put forth in this thesis. Unfortunately, UAV 
mechanical issues after the first flight prevented in-depth testing during the field 
experiment. The implications of aerial relay nodes are well known (as discussed in 
Chapter II), but initial experiment results point to the immense potential benefit for 
network operators to have a real-time view of the impact of UAV mobility within 
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dynamic MANET topologies. Additionally, the concept of using UGVs as network relays 
has merit. The ability to leverage terrain features to provide a semi-fixed network relay 
position enables the use of more robust equipment because UGVs do not have the same 
weight capacity limitations as UAVs. During this experiment, the ability to view the 
UGV node’s location via network visualization provided network operators the means to 
identify inadequate node placement and direct movement to optimize network 
performance. 
B. CENETIX COUNTER-WMD EXPERIMENT (OCTOBER 2015) 
OBSERVATIONS 
Building on the knowledge gained in the June 2015 experiment, CWMD 
experimentation in October 2015 continued to explore distributed knowledge sharing, 
leveraging a centralized location for operational C2 and network management located at 
the USCG Station Yerba Buena in San Francisco Bay. As discussed in Chapter III, a 
primary focus of this experiment was the use of distributed assets across the CENETIX 
backbone network, including unmanned ground and underwater vehicles. This section 
outlines the observations and conclusions based on the October 2015 CWMD 
experiment.  
The distributed and hybrid nature of the experimentation network exceeded the 
capabilities of the Wave Relay Network Management tool. The open-architecture design 
of the CodeMettle system filled this gap by integrating inputs from traditional network 
management information protocols (e.g., SNMP), as well as MANET node/network data 
previously available through the Wave Relay Management Interface.  
The unified network dashboard provided network operators direct access to 
critical network management functionality. CodeMettle allowed users to see 
performance, configuration and fault information without having to sort through multiple 
windows or tabs. The integrated map provided a holistic view of the network, including 
the ability to quickly identify clutter and direct the movement of nodes to compensate for 
fluctuations in network performance or changes in mission requirements. Additionally, 
the rich graphical representation of node and network QoS information reduced 
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equivocality for network operators. This evolution from textual display of network 
performance data to a graphical illustration of this information combined with map view 
of node location and links, reduced ambiguity in interpreting network changes and 
improved the network operator’s ability to quickly gain situational awareness. 
Arguably, one of the most significant observations regarding the use of 
CodeMettle was the emergence of pattern recognition-enabled network management 
responses. The CENETIX testbed network experienced several major faults that 
temporarily halted the experiment; several of these faults would not have been visible if 
investigators had been solely relying on the Wave Relay Management Interface. For 
example, during the first day of experimentation researchers found that they were unable 
to access collaborative tools on the CENETIX Resource Portal. It was initially assumed 
by researchers in the field that there was a severed communications link within the 
CENETIX backbone network. However, the CodeMettle interface provided a clear 
indication to network operators that the low latency within the network pointed to a 
server issue, not a degraded communication link within the network. Figure 37 depicts 
the NSO dashboard view fault as the fault occurred. Using this information, CENETIX 




Figure 37.  CodeMettle NSO Dashboard View during Major Server Fault 
 
 
A similar observation occurred during the second day of experimentation in San 
Francisco Bay. During this phase of the experiment, six U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary 
boats and a San Francisco Police maritime patrol vessel were equipped with MANET 
radios and were tasked to intercept a target vessel. Figure 38 shows these nodes operating 
normally immediately after getting underway from Yerba Buena Island.  
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Figure 38.  Normal MANET Operations during October 2015 Experiment 
 
 
After the boats were underway and moving to intercept the target vessel, the NOC 
consistently lost the ability to communicate with them at a range of approximately 4 
kilometers from Yerba Buena Island. Using the CodeMettle NSO Tactical Dashboard, 
network operators quickly recognized that they were still able to connect with two Wave 
Relay radios that were within the NOC but could not connect with the MPU-4s on the 
boats. Figure 39 shows the dashboard view during this fault. This immediately indicated 
that the connection between the Wave Relay Quad Radio router’s sector antenna located 
on the tower adjacent to the NOC building was no longer functioning correctly. There 
was no fault indication provided to the network operator because CodeMettle could not 
directly communicate with the Wave Relay Quad Radio router located on the tower due 
to the configuration of the USCG network firewall. However, the network operator did 
receive fault indications due to the loss of communications with the underway nodes. It 
was subsequently determined that the boats were initially communicating directly to the 
radios in the NOC building and that the Quad Radio router  
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Figure 39.  Quad Radio Failure as Viewed from CodeMettle NSO 
 
 
Overall experimentation required a hybrid approach to backbone networking due 
to resource limitations and operational constraints (e.g., access to multiple UAVs and 
airspace restrictions preventing UAV operations in San Francisco Bay). Coupled with the 
distributed nature of experiments over a wide geographic area, the October 2015 
experiment required the use of satellite communication systems—satellite connectivity 
was required to network UGV inland and remote UUV connection. The inability to rely 
solely on MANET communications for this experiment points to the challenge of 
ensuring adequate node density to support mission requirements. This also indicates the 
relevance and potential contributions of tactical cube and pico-satellites in littoral 
operations.  
The integration of unmanned vehicles during the October 2015 experiment 
yielded observations very relevant to littoral operations. For example, even though UUV 
operations are still nascent, NUWC Keyport has devoted significant resources to the 
research and development of new UUV technologies and C2 capabilities required to 
make them viable for tactical operations. There is significant potential tactical benefit for 
the use of UUVs as networked nodes to provide undersea surveillance as well as to 
contribute covert site exploitation information for tactical operations. Information 
provided by UUV nodes would contribute to the commander’s understanding of the 
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environment and potentially provide covert means to share information across a hostile 
environment. Additionally, the use of UGVs in littoral areas, both as network relays and 
sensing platforms, allows littoral commanders to extend their influence and capabilities 
ashore while reducing risk to personnel in dangerous environments. This is particularly 
relevant in the realm of counter-WMD and the stand-off detection of radiological/nuclear 
materials.  
C. LITTORAL OPERATIONS VIGNETTE 
Consider the littoral operations scenario offered in Chapter I—an AFP tasked to 
conduct EMIO operations in a contested littoral environment. UAVs are launched to 
search a near-shore region for an unmarked FIAC carrying a container of nuclear 
material; their effective search area is expanded by their ability to relay telemetry and 
sensor data to UAVs operating past LOS range of the AFP. The network operator sees 
not only the PLI for the UAV, but also the health of the links between the UAVs and can 
direct their positioning to ensure the network connection is maintained for the mission-
critical video feed coming from the UAV. After identifying the potential target vessel, the 
AFP launches a USV carrying a standoff nuclear detection system. The USV is tasked to 
conduct standoff detection to confirm the identity of the vessel, however the target vessel 
moved behind a small island. It is not clear to the network operator if the island will 
block communications between the USV and AFP. As the USV navigates around the 
island, network connectivity between the USV and the AFP becomes degraded; the 
network operator subsequently restores this connection by choosing a UAV to maneuver 
in order to extend the overhead relay link to the USV. The USV detects the presence of 
the radioactive isotope and transmits the spectrograph back to the AFP for reachback 
analysis. Once confirmed, two Mark VI patrol boats are directed to intercept and board 
the vessel. As they close the VOI, the network operator detects failing node links, and 
then receives fault notifications in the NMS indicating a potential jamming source from 
the adjacent shoreline. In response, the network operator directs the movement of one 
UAV a closer location to attempt to burn through the attempted jamming and restore the 
communications link to the patrol boat. Initial indications showed that this was 
insufficient, so the network operator maneuvers the UAV and USV in tandem to bolster 
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the network connection with the patrol boat by chaining the relay nodes and leveraging 
the higher transmit power of the USV to overcome the jamming signal.  
During this hypothetical scenario, the decision-maker was faced with providing 
all functions of MANET management (configure, heal, optimize, monitor and protect). 
The effects of these functions in cyberspace manifest in the physical realm. As a result, 
the robustness and adaptability of this network were enabled by MANET node mobility 
as a function of network configuration and reconfiguration. Based on the observations 
and findings of CENETIX experimentation, this is most effectively accomplished 
through a unified network management approach. More specifically, the combination of 
graphically-represented network performance information and 3-D map visualization of 
networked nodes would provide the network operator the ability to maintain situational 
awareness and more effectively direct the placement of these nodes.  
The complex domain of the littorals precludes the ability for a decision-maker to 
be fully aware of what impacts the combination of environmental dynamics, enemy 
action and the movements of their own assets will have on their network. However, as 
discussed in Chapter II, the decision maker can anticipate initial conditions, to some 
degree, based on a preconceived understanding of the mission, tacit knowledge gained 
from previous experiences, and initial or intended friendly force disposition. The use of 
MANET in the littorals expanded decision maker’s ability to observe patterns of response 
through networked UAV and USV nodes. These nodes also provided multiple “safe-to-
fail” options, allowing the network operator to probe network performance changes using 
topology manipulation (e.g., the ability to move several different nodes to bolster the 
network connection to the patrol boat). The network operator was able to observe the 
effects of the first node movement to determine if the actions were successful. When 
initial observations indicated different results than expected, the network operator had the 
flexibility to adjust and adapt to the situation. 
By breaking down the process elements from the decision-making and network 
management perspectives, it is possible to map them as they interact with each other as 
well as through the network that is impacted by cyber and physical clutter and enemy 
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action. The model depicted in Figure 40 does not directly consider the enemy’s decision 
process; rather, it addresses enemy activity as a direct influencer on the physical network.  
Figure 40.  Cyber-Physical Network Decision-making Model 
 
 
In this model, anticipatory and probing actions previously discussed directly influence the 
configuration of the MANET as it is deployed. Patterns of response to probing actions are 
sensed through the monitoring functions of network management. Response actions 
result in reconfiguration that contribute to the robustness and adaptation of the MANET 
to counter the effects of cyber and physical clutter. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis has been the exploration of emerging network 
management tools as they support tactical-level mesh networks and their impact on C2 
decision making in the littoral domain. A specific contribution of this research was the 
demonstration of the value of network management tools for the human-network 
interface and, by reducing uncertainty and equivocality, the positive impact of effective 
network management on situational awareness and decision making in the littorals. 
Emerging network management tools can support tactical-level MANET and influence 
C2 in littoral operations by providing decision makers (e.g., the Tactical Action Officer) 
real-time awareness of dynamic MANET topology and the ability to effectively redirect 
and reposition networked assets to mitigate network performance fluctuations and 
support mission requirements.  
Cyber-physical systems embody the integration of computational and physical 
capabilities that enable interaction with the physical world across cyber space; 
understanding, visualizing, and managing this interaction through the human-network 
interface is a crucial step forward towards integrating manned and unmanned systems in 
the complex littoral environment. The unique nature of the littoral environment, in terms 
of the presence of physical and cyber clutter discussed earlier, makes the importance of 
physical layer management even more relevant. The integration of manned and 
unmanned platforms will require a paradigm shift in how a force’s actions affect, and are 
impacted by, the dynamic nature of physical and cyber clutter within the littoral 
battlespace. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout this thesis, discussions regarding network management have relied on 
abstractions as a means to simplify immensely technical processes and technologies. In 
reality, network operators are not dealing with abstract nodes—network management and 
network adaptation occurs at all layers of the OSI stack. For example, “healing” 
mechanisms may refer to elements at the internet layer (e.g., resilient proactive/reactive 
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routing protocols) but can also apply to the application layer. Likewise, protection plays 
an important role at all layers within the network (e.g., intrusion detection, firewalls, 
encryption, etc.). These inner workings of network management functionality are critical 
to the operation of any network, tactical or otherwise. However, traditional network 
management functions are, and in many ways should be, transparent to the commander 
making decisions in a tactical environment unless some aspect of the network is 
compromised or fails to work as designed. In contrast, MANET physical layer 
management must be explicitly considered during mission planning and asset deployment 
to be effective. Therefore, the critical convergence between MANET management and 
C2 decision-making in the littorals occurs at the OSI physical layer via topology control 
and the physical placement and maneuver of network nodes.  
The complexity of the littorals, and the previously discussed implications on 
MANET management in the littoral domain, warrant consideration that the tactical-level 
decision maker becomes a network operator, who directly interprets human-network 
interface information to determine overall network effectiveness and direct action in 
order to fight the network (and sensors) as a weapons system. The network agnostic 
approach used by CodeMettle for the management of heterogeneous networked systems, 
standards and protocols provides a new level of flexibility to give network operators a 
holistic view of the network. As conventional network management systems are not 
compatible with MANET technologies, the open-architecture design of the CodeMettle 
software allows the integration of inputs from traditional network management 
information protocols (e.g. SNMP), as well as MANET node/network data previously 
available through the Wave Relay Management Interface and Wave Relay API. The 
unified network management approach enables the network operator to perceive and 
proactively manipulate the network.  
Human perception drives the creation of knowledge, awareness and 
understanding, resulting in action through decision-making in the cognitive domain. The 
complex decision domain faced in the littorals requires decision makers to identify 
multiple courses of action and maintain them as probing actions can reveal emergent 
order from patterns of response within the network. Because the response patterns may be 
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subtle and manifest over time, or be interpreted in different ways, perceiving these 
responses requires a rich human-network interface visualization. Improving decision-
making cycles requires real-time situational understanding of the scalable and flexible 
mesh architecture in littoral operations. Mobile ad hoc networks require constant 
reconfiguration based on network performance feedback. Data from the entire network 
must be collected and viewable by network operators in order to take advantage of the 
dynamic topologies of mesh networks through node mobility. The opportunity to explore 
CodeMettle’s unified dashboard interface during the October 2015 experiment indicated 
that the network operator’s ability to quickly identify, assess, and react to changes in 
network performance was greatly enhanced when compared to the textual display in the 
Wave Relay Management Interface.  
The US Navy currently lacks the ability to efficiently anticipate or redirect assets 
in response to network degradation resulting from interactions with physical and cyber 
clutter unique to the littorals. During June 2015 CENETIX experimentation, map 
visualization was a key enabler for NOC personnel to identify and mitigate issues caused 
by cyber and physical clutter. Additionally, map visualization gave network operators the 
ability to optimize the placement of network relay nodes and provided immediate 
performance feedback based on the network topology reconfiguration. The 2D map 
interface available in the October 2015 iteration of the CodeMettle NSO developed for 
CENETIX performed adequately when compared to the 3D KML available from the 
CENETIX SA Server and Wave Relay Management Interface. However, UAV 
operations were not included in the October 2015 experimentation. The benefits of 3D 
visualization for UAV operations during June 2015 experimentation were apparent and 
the development of 3D maps for the CodeMettle dashboard has been recommended to the 
CodeMettle team.  
MANET technology is the manifestation of NCW at the tactical edge. However, 
the implementation of multi-hop mesh networking capabilities to provide adaptive and 
resilient networking in support of collaboration and C2 in high-density, complex or 
contested environments at the tactical edge requires an aggressive approach to network 
management. Modern U.S. littoral warfare can capitalize on the integration of a new 
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generation of vessels, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), by applying MANET 
technologies to enable shared data flows between other littoral assets and unmanned 
systems and sensors functioning as network nodes. The combination of these assets will 
be enabled through a self-forming, self-healing mesh network that improves information 
sharing, increasing situational awareness and overall mission effectiveness in the littorals 
and beyond. However, the full-scale integration of tactical maritime UxV systems is 
codependent with ubiquitous MANET implementation. Additionally, the human-network 
interface supporting the tactical management of these networks must be a primary 
consideration in order to maximize the potential benefits of these technologies in the 
complex littorals. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis builds upon ongoing CENETIX research and experimentation 
campaigns to further the operationalization of network management; however, it does so 
with an emphasis on implications for network management as a warfighting tool in the 
littoral domain. As an exploratory thesis, some of the conclusions herein represent 
nascent hypotheses that would benefit from quantitative testing. Other assertions in this 
thesis challenge traditional organizational/doctrinal paradigms and require in-depth 
analysis.  
The human-network interface as the primary conduit for building human 
perception to create knowledge, and subsequently drive action in the cognitive domain, is 
an area that requires further consideration. The emergence of pattern recognition behavior 
with network visualization tools as an enhancement to traditional network management 
methods may provide avenues for improving response time and sensitivity to network 
performance degradations. A quantitative hypothesis based on this observation may yield 
useful insights into how future tactical network management systems should address 
human-systems integration issues. 
From an organizational standpoint, the implications of role-based relationships 
and the flattening of organizational structures in MANET-enabled, small-unit groups for 
the culture and doctrine of the U.S. Navy need to be analyzed, specifically, the 
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relationship between the AFP, traditional hierarchical command structures, and the CWC 
construct for maritime C2. With regards to managing the network as a weapons system, a 
robust concept of operations is required to identify roles, responsibilities, capabilities and 
information requirements at each level of command (e.g., ship, AFP, Task Force).  
The primary assumption of this thesis is that the U.S. Navy will continue to move 
forward with the development of MANET systems. However, the implementation of 
MANET technology and management systems still face tremendous technical challenges 
before these systems can be fielded in the tactical maritime environment. This will 
require further research and development for MANET systems at every level of the OSI 
stack. Furthermore, continued research into integrating commercial-off-the-shelf 
MANET systems for UxV control and relay capability for tactical operations in the 
littorals can provide crucial insights for the design and production of new UxVs that are 
integrate with next generation MANET systems (including “smart” physical layer 
capabilities, like phased array antennas, to improve radio performance and lower 
probability of interception/detection). Physical layer implementation research could also 
benefit from further exploration into the use of control links (separate from data link 
connections) to provide an out-of-band mesh control layer to improve manageability of 
highly dynamic MANET. Additionally, the application and management of delay-tolerant 
networks as a means to provide resilient data paths in disconnected, intermittent, or low-
bandwidth environments should be considered. 
The dynamic management of MANET-enabled assets will require the 
incorporation of UxV control, C2 and network management functions into a unified 
system. The open-architecture design of new network management systems like 
CodeMettle provide significant flexibility and adaptability to evolve with improvements 
in technologies and capabilities. However, the ability to connect and integrate these 
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